Consortium Fighter Evolution

Aurora

            The Aurora was not the first jet fighter – Collective and Directorate pilots flew grotesque precursors in the last months of the Tyrants’ War – but it was the first built to a pattern still widely used a decade on. It had sharply swept-back wings, a large frontal air intake and a stubby fuselage containing a primitive turbojet. Crews used to piston-engine fighters were often surprised at its small size and mechanical simplicity – the turbojet had fewer moving parts than radial or inline engines though it ran at higher temperatures and used more advanced materials. Some compared it to a drag racer – an extensively stripped-down machine that ignored comfort and aesthetics in return for high performance. On its combat debut the Aurora proved superior to competing designs. Consortium clients snapped it up or built it under license while their opponents copied it.

            Though fast and agile for its time the Aurora had some notable flaws. It was not truly supersonic (but could break the speed of sound in dives) had a short range and endurance, and carried the same weapons as older piston-engine fighters: cannons and unguided rockets. Most kills were made at shorter ranges, aiming being difficult due to higher closing speeds. Older fighters could outturn it and bomber crews could return fire. The Aurora was also hard to fly. At high angles of attack it was prone to wingtip stall and a rapidly worsening loss of control. Many inexperienced pilots – or those used to more conventional aircraft – suffered crashes at low speeds or catastrophic airframe failure at higher speeds and altitudes. Consortium designers never fully solved these problems but lessened them to some extent with drop tanks, simple onboard radar, improved sights and wing fences. Pilots also benefited from new training programmes that drew on hard-won experience and losses outside combat fell. These fighters are rare today, though a handful are still flown by wealthy collectors, militia and crime lords.

Medea

            The many designers who copied the Aurora usually tried to improve its performance with larger, more powerful engines and more sharply swept back wings. These allowed increased top speeds but demanded longer runways and made known handling problems worse. Despite being fitted with ever more complex wing fences, airbrakes and leading edge slats the first true supersonic fighters were often viewed as borderline deathtraps that took great courage and skill to fly.

            The Consortium Medea used a simple but unorthodox airframe to overcome these challenges. Its inversely tapered wings negated tip stall and the need for compensation systems. A fuselage that narrowed slightly where it met the wings and tail, in accordance with the area rule, further raised efficiency. The main landing wheels folded outwards so drop tanks and external weapons could be carried closer to the fuselage. The Medea’s strange appearance belied a fighter that could outperform competitors with larger and more powerful engines but more complex, less efficient airframes. Associated benefits were reduced construction and maintenance costs, improved reliability, a longer operating life and lower rate of accidents. The Medea’s pilots and ground crews came to appreciate these traits but these aircraft were never widely exported – perhaps due to common notions of what jet fighters should look like.

            Those that saw action served with distinction. At a time of growing paranoia about nuclear attacks they could operate from shorter runways and be quickly refuelled and rearmed. Their heavy cannon armament was deadly at close quarters, but their crude beam-guided missiles proved bulky, unreliable and inaccurate. Late production models had slightly larger air intakes, shock cones containing more powerful radar, and a better missile armament including early heat seekers. In poorer, remoter parts of the world these fighters are still flown today.

            Though innovative for its time, further tests on the Medea convinced the Consortium the swept-back wing had been fully explored. While other manufacturers turned to variable geometry the Consortium opted for simpler delta and lozenge designs.

Ishtar

            Plans to counter bomber fleets with large numbers of cheap interceptors reached their apex with the Fireshark, a simple delta-wing machine designed to climb fast and hit hard. As manned bombers were replaced with ballistic missiles some Firesharks were refitted as fighters but proved too specialised to excel in this role. The Consortium Ishtar was designed as a fighter from the start. It shared some traits with the Fireshark though many of these were improved.

            Fighters had been growing larger, faster and more heavily armed; most now had two engines and two crew who shared a heavy workload. Greater emphasis was placed on long range guided missiles and combat outside visual range. Some carried no guns at all, as dogfighting was largely dismissed as the folly of a vanished age. Variable geometry allowed high speeds during combat and low speeds during takeoff and landing but increased weight and complexity.

            The Ishtar took a different approach. It had a single seat and engine like older Consortium fighters but its performance was much more impressive. The compound delta wing was lighter and stronger than variable geometry systems and offered more agility than the cropped delta on the Fireshark. The canards enhanced this last trait and improved low-speed handling. Its missile armament was light but its radar was more powerful and a single cannon was retained. As with later Firesharks the Ishtar was deployed in teams of lightly armed “hunters” with stronger radar and “destroyers” with heavier armament. Combat simulations included close range dogfighting, a lost art in many air forces.

            The Ishtar quickly proved its worth in short wars fought by client states. The specialised hunters could locate larger fighters first and respond as they saw fit. They could guide destroyers’ missiles to targets at a greater range while destroyers that closed with their enemies were smaller, more agile, and harder to hit. They scored many kills with cannons, to the chagrin of tacticians who had thought these weapons obsolete. Even when opponents had higher kill ratios, the Ishtar’s lower operating costs could still give Consortium clients the edge. The loss of one Ishtar along with its pilot was less damaging than that of a heavy fighter with two equally experienced crew.

            Unlike the earlier Medea, the Ishtar was widely exported and even reverse engineered. There are rare but definite accounts of Consortium-trained mercenaries fighting on opposing sides in identical machines. The Consortium was at its strongest when the Ishtar was at the height of its fame. These aircraft were further refined over time but gradually fell out of favour as new competitors appeared.

Minerva

            The Minerva has an unusual history, being designed as a replacement for the highly successful Ishtar, but built at a time when relations between world powers were improving. Looking back, it could be viewed as another technological milestone or a waste of valuable resources. It is also notable for having never seen much combat though when it first appeared it was a very capable machine.

            The Minerva’s better traits included a broader, flatter fuselage that provided added lift, twin tails which offered redundancy and safer high speed ejections, and two engines that were widely spaced and could use differential thrust to aid manoeuvring. Its reclining seat was comfortable and improved resistance to g forces, and more modern avionics, including fly-by-wire systems, reduced the single pilot’s workload. A larger missile armament let it serve many different roles and though designed for dogfighting, the single rotary cannon also proved effective at destroying the light unmanned drones increasingly seen in combat zones.

            The Minerva found a ready market with long-term Consortium clients, but comparable designs from the fledgling Veyon Industries had many questioning the claim it was the best fighter in the world. Over the next decade a grim technological contest ensued. Late Minerva variants proved inferior to Veyon designs that combined multiple control planes with innovative forward-swept wings. Veyon avionics were even more sophisticated and after losing many clients to the aggressive newcomers Consortium engineers concentrated on new stealth technologies.

Circe

            The Circe was the last great Consortium fighter. It was a major gambit, one step short of directly attacking Veyon industrial complexes. Many other projects were abandoned or downsized to help fund its development.

            The Circe embodied a new approach to air combat. It was designed to fly higher and faster than earlier jet aircraft and avoid detection before scoring kills at longer ranges. Designers had already found the Minerva’s lower profile reduced radar echoes from some angles. The Circe took this trait to extremes. It was completely tailless, with a widened, flattened form and knifelike leading and trailing edges. Its external geometry – straight lines and recurring angles – radar-absorbent skin and advanced heat suppression made it almost undetectable outside visual range. The large one-piece canopy was electronically polarised to reduce glare at high altitudes and the pilot’s superb all-round view was augmented with radar, IR and TV. Missiles were carried internally, which also helped to lessen drag, and a single-barrelled chaingun was mounted in the fighter’s nose.

            Though not designed for dogfighting the Circe’s tandem biplane layout and inherent instability made it highly manoeuvrable but hard to handle manually. Turns were achieved with split ailerons and/or vectored engine thrust. The fly-by-wire control systems made constant small corrections in flight, leaving pilots free to concentrate on surveillance and attack. During combat simulations pilots who were new to the Circe repeatedly bested comrades with many years’ experience in the older jets they flew.

            The Circe was an impressive machine but the costs it incurred were never regained. Sudden, unexpected shifts occurred in world politics, sidelining remaining clients and allowing Veyon Industries to absorb the Consortium before the Circe could be mass produced. Some of those involved in the project accepted this change of leadership in true mercenary style, but others were more wary of Veyon ideology and took their expertise elsewhere.

            In deference to the Consortium’s long history of excellence, Veyon magnates adopted the practice of naming fighters after goddesses, as seen in the Hel and Hecate. Defectors who moved to Coalition states took up the local practice of naming single seat designs after single handed weapons – such as the Broadsword and Rapier – and their larger counterparts after double handed weapons like the Glaive and Claymore. Many neutral observers believe a war between these factions – though steeped in ideology – will be won through the further development of Consortium technology.